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This chapter introduces the British MPs’ expenses scandal; its origins, evolution and 
consequences. We argue that despite some early predictions, the scandal was limited 
in its impact: the purported ‘revolution’ never occurred. We briefly review the 
comparative literature on political impact of scandal, which illustrates why the effects 
of scandals are usually limited and reasons why voters may choose not to punish 
malfeasant politicians. We situate this scandal against other, international scandals, 
highlighting similarities and differences in the effects of scandal depending on 
cultural contexts. The chapter illustrates the mediated nature of the scandal and how it 
is best understood as comprised of not only the acts of politicians themselves, but a 
series of moves and counter-moves by the press and other actors. 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
On 8 May 2009 the Daily Telegraph began publishing un-redacted expenses claims 
made by British MPs. The revelation of parliamentary expenses showed how, and the 
extent to which, some MPs took advantage of an unregulated expenses system—a 
system designed by, and vigorously protected against outside interference, by MPs 
themselves. The expenses regime was intended to cover the costs of performing 
parliamentary duties: operating costs for running constituency offices (including staff 
salaries, rent, computers, etc.) and communications and travel as part of their 
parliamentary duties. The regime also included Additional Costs Allowances (ACA)1, 
worth up to £24,000 annually, to reimburse MPs for the expense of staying away from 
their primary home while performing their parliamentary duties.  
 
 
It was, predominantly, MPs’ ACA claims that captured media headlines and public 
attention in the weeks that followed the Telegraph’s initial disclosure. Both the public 
and pundits reveled in, and were reviled by, some of the now (in)famous claims 
made: a duck house, a trouser press, chocolate bars, plasma TVs, a riding lawn 
mower, jellied eels, moat cleaning, light bulbs, dog food, Kenyan carpets, and 
hanging baskets and potted plants. However, it was the practice of ‘flipping’ or 
switching an MP’s designated second home (which was eligible for ACA expenses), 
that revealed the extent to which the expenses regime could be manipulated to 
maximize personal gain. MPs reaped the benefits of renovating and maintaining their 
properties at taxpayers’ expense: mortgage interest on second homes was tax 
deductible and many were sold on at a profit with MPs pocketing any subsequent 
capital gains.  
 
 
 
 
The first few days of the Telegraph’s revelations started with members of the then 
governing Labour party, senior ministers in particular, but after a few days switched 
its attention to senior Conservatives and Liberal Democrats before turning to rank-
and-file members of all political parties. What quickly became apparent was the 
degree to which Members were implicated. This was not a scandal limited to a few 
‘bad apples’, but rather, engulfed many in the House of Commons. Its institutional 
nature dictated that media and public scrutiny could not simply focus on individual 
cases of wrong-doing, but was compelled to consider the rules and regulations—
established by MPs themselves—governing parliamentary expenses.  
 
 
The institution-wide focus revealed that while many were implicated in the scandal 
and charged in the court of public opinion as having abused the system, very few MPs 
had engaged in outright illegal behaviour. Of the millions of claims made, the vast 
majority were made within ‘the rules’, a point many a MP was quick to cite as 
justification for their behaviour. Yet in attempting to direct attention away from 
individual cases of purported wrongdoing and towards the institution itself, MPs 
placed the expenses regime on the front line. With the public eye centered firmly on 
life inside the Commons, the intensity and secrecy with which Parliament sought to 
protect the expenses regime from external scrutiny was revealed. The next section 
briefly outlines the emergence and evolution of the expenses scandal, showing how 
repeated efforts were made to exempt the expenses regime from efforts to make the 
system more transparent and accountable.  
 
 
A Scandal Unfolds: A Brief Chronology 
 
 
Few outside of the Westminster Village could claim to know much about MPs’ pay 
and expenses before May 2009. However, that changed markedly with the disclosure 
of MPs’ expenses claims by the Telegraph. The revelations resulted in a perfect storm 
that dominated media coverage in the weeks that followed (vanHeerde-Hudson 2011), 
and save for the handful of journalists heavily involved in preparing the data for 
publication, few could have predicted the fallout from the disclosure and the fury of 
the British public (Winnett and Rayner 2009). But for many in the Commons, 
parliamentary expenses had been an issue of concern and contention dating back as 
early as 2004, when Heather Brooke, an investigative journalist, began making 
requests to the Commons’ Data Protection Office to release information concerning 
MPs expenses.2 Later that year the Commons did publish the information, broken 
down by office, travel and ACA claims, but the aggregated nature of the report meant 
that the details of MPs’ individual claims remained hidden from public view (Winnett 
and Rayner 2009).  
 
By 2005, Brooke’s requests had company, as two other journalists, Ben Leapman and 
Jon Ungoed-Thomas, made similar requests to the Commons’ new FOI Office. All 
three were rebuked, often with personal involvement from then Speaker Michael 
Martin—citing the costs of preparing the reports and concerns over Members’ 
privacy—which ultimately contributed to his resignation in May 2009. Undeterred, 
appeals were filed with the Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, in 2006. 
 
 
Meanwhile, some in the Commons didn’t intend to wait for the Information 
Commissioner’s decision. Conservative MP for Penrith and the Border, David 
Maclean, sponsored a bill that would have exempted Parliament from FOI, thereby 
 
 
ensuring secrecy for MPs’ expenses (Barrett and Bloxham 2010). The bill ultimately 
failed and in 2007 the Commissioner ruled that ACA claims should be published, 
disaggregated by the various categories, but without detailed receipts. This partial 
release of information satisfied neither side and appeals were lodged with the 
Information Tribunal, the appellate body on FOI requests. In February 2008 the 
Tribunal upheld the Commissioner’s decision; it also went further, suggesting that 
allowances should be published except in cases where protecting them was 
‘absolutely necessary’. It was also at the Tribunal’s hearing that the controversial 
‘John Lewis List’ was made public for the first time (see Worthy, chapter 2).  
 
 
In the following months, the issue of expenses was actively being played out in 
Westminster, featuring in a few newspaper headlines, but with no real splash or 
indication of what was to come. And once again, Parliament intervened, this time 
appealing the Tribunal’s decision to the High Court. However, in May 2008 the Court 
upheld the Tribunal’s decision and ordered the publication of detailed expenses 
claims. The Commons indicated that it would do so by October of 2008, but this was 
pushed back several times with little to no explanation from Commons officials. But 
the all-quiet was soon explained as Parliament, led by the Leader of the House of 
Commons, Harriet Harman, made a final attempt to exempt the House form FOI 
legislation. However, the bill quickly ran into trouble, with many MPs fearing the 
legislation looked ‘as if they had something to hide’ (Winnett and Rayner 2009: 29). 
The bill failed and Parliament reluctantly agreed to disclose detailed information on 
expenses in June 2009.  
 
 
 
However, Parliament’s publication of expenses claims was spectacularly thwarted by 
the Telegraph’s acquisition of a disk containing millions of non-redacted claims 
dating back to 2004. The disk was sold to the Telegraph for £300,000 by John Wick, 
a former SAS officer, on two conditions: ‘first, that the Telegraph had to publish 
details of expenses immediately, and second, that the alleged abuse of expenses 
would not be used for partisan purposes, but would expose what was believed to be 
systematic abuse of parliamentary allowances’ (vanHeerde-Hudson 2011: 245; 
Winnett and Rayner 2009).3  
 
In the days and weeks following the Telegraph’s revelations, there was little talk or 
focus on issues save for parliamentary expenses, as each new allegation and response 
contributed to a seemingly unending saga. Life inside the Commons was increasingly 
unbearable, as many Members anxiously reviewed their own claims, awaiting their 
turn to answer for perceived excesses (Winnett and Rayner 2009; see Wright, chapter 
3). Only a few scandals in history had shaken the political foundations of the country 
so intensely, and none in living memory. Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
called it the ‘biggest parliamentary scandal for two centuries’.4 In an effort to respond 
to the crisis party leaders uniformly condemned the abuses, a handful of MPs were 
deselected by their parties and a record number of MPs announced their retirement. 
The Independent Parliamentary Standards Agency (IPSA) was created to oversee the 
investigation into MPs expenses and to design and administer a new expenses regime.  
 
 
Properly understood then, the expenses scandal and public anger that arose as a result, 
was not about castigating politicians as criminals or indeed criminal behaviour in the 
true sense of the word; only a handful of MPs were charged with criminal wrong 
 
 
doing.5 It was the intentional lack of transparency and accountability that governed 
the parliamentary allowances scheme that was widely perceived to be the real offence. 
That MPs had deliberately sought to keep expenses details from being disclosed and 
were essentially free to regulate their own activities, reinforced for many in the public 
the belief that politicians are subject to a different set of rules and standards and 
increasingly ‘out of touch’ with the lives of ‘ordinary’ British citizens.  
 
 
The consequences and fallout from the scandal were expected to be severe. Survey 
data from May-June 2009 showed that only a small percentage of the British public 
had not heard of the scandal and most were angry about it (YouGov 2010) and trust, 
while historically low, had fallen further as a result of the scandal (Hansard Society 
2010). Public opinion of politicians also fell: 50 per cent of the public thought that 
MPs: spend their time furthering personal and career interests (Hansard Society 
2010); are unprincipled (47 per cent); are more interested in serving their own 
personal interest (66 per cent); are dishonest (48 per cent); and are out of touch with 
the day-to-day lives of their constituents (70 per cent) (YouGov 2010). How would 
the expenses scandal change the political landscape if citizens and voters acted on 
their anger and distrust? What impact would the scandal have in the short and long-
term? This volume aims to answer these and other questions detailed in the next 
section.  
 
Aims of the Volume 
The aim of this volume is to comprehensively examine the 2009 British MPs’ 
expenses scandal, its anatomy, evolution and consequences. In the chapters that 
follow, the authors consider the scandal across a number of domains: the scandal’s 
 
 
origins in Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation; how MPs viewed the expenses 
regime and their efforts to protect it; its impact on turnout, vote choice and retirement; 
public perceptions of MPs’ involvement in the scandal and on their reputations; 
evidence of media bias in reporting the scandal; and the efforts to reform the expenses 
regime and unintended consequences of reform efforts in the wake of the scandal.  
 
More generally, the volume considers two views that have emerged concerning the 
impact of the scandal. The first view holds that while the scandal was a significant 
political event, similar to scandals elsewhere, it would not have a significant impact 
on British political life. Any evidence of short-term falls in trust and confidence in 
parties and politicians would likely return to previous levels as memory of the scandal 
faded. This view did not discount institutional reform to the expenses regime itself, 
but more generally didn't see the expenses scandal as a catalyst for fundamental 
change to the way of doing politics. The second view saw the expenses scandal as a 
political earthquake that shook Westminster to its core, the consequences of which, 
would be instant and irrevocable.6 Bell (2012: 2-3) has described it as a ‘revolution’, 
providing a permanent change to the way we do politics in Britain. Given the intense 
media scrutiny, and public fury that followed the Telegraph’s revelations, it was more 
than credible that the expenses scandal was the juggernaut needed to clean up British 
politics. 
 
Here, we assess the evidence for both views. Was the MPs’ expenses scandal a 
revolution, as purported by Bell (2009), or was the impact relatively limited, as 
consistent with the general findings from the comparative literature on scandal? Our 
findings show, that the revolution never happened: with a few exceptions where we see 
 
 
significant scandal effects, the full force of public anger never really took hold, 
particularly in electoral terms. The most significant impact of the scandal is IPSA:  an 
independent body created to both regulate and administer a new expenses regime, 
however, even its long-term existence is not assured (see chapters 9 and 10).  
 
 
The volume draws on contributions from a range of outstanding UK and international 
academic and non-academic experts. Each chapter provides original research drawing 
on a rich range of data and a variety of methodological approaches. Care has been 
taken to translate findings from quantitative approaches so that they are widely 
consumable. Each of the chapters focuses primarily on the British MPs’ expenses 
scandal, and where appropriate, consideration is given to scandals elsewhere. In this 
vein, a secondary aim of the volume is to consider the expenses scandal 
comparatively, drawing on the findings regarding scandals in other countries and 
contexts to see where there are similarities and/or differences. This is not to say the 
method is comparative; we aim only to view the British scandal in light of the 
comparative literature.  
 
The Scandal: Legacy and Aftermath 
This volume looks at the impact of the scandal some five years after the initial 
publication of parliamentary expenses, and while the intensity and scrutiny of the 
initial episode no longer exists, a line has not yet been drawn under it. Fortunately, it 
does not render this analysis premature; rather, it points to the continued saliency of 
parliamentary expenses for the British public, the consequences of rapid reform in the 
wake of the scandal and the inherent difficulties in balancing two competing 
objectives—facilitating MPs’ ability to perform their parliamentary duties and 
 
 
ensuring accountability and value for money in the use of public monies, particularly 
in the context of the current economic climate. And with some distance between the 
onset and today, we can consider it in light of its short and medium term 
consequences.  
 
As recently as May 2013, Peter Oborne argued that MPs had not learned lessons from 
the 2009 scandal as evidenced by their continued criticism of IPSA, the body in 
charge of regulating the new expenses regime, and ‘failing to accept [its] authority’ 
(Oborne 2013; see also Gay, chapter 9). And it’s not just MPs’ dissatisfaction with 
IPSA that yields headlines, but expenses related behaviour: claiming expenses for 
business class flights despite being against the rules (Watts 2013); claiming expenses 
for learning their respective partner’s languages (Brocklebank 2013); and perhaps 
most importantly, in taking advantage of a ‘loophole’ in the new regime that allowed 
MPs to rent tax-payer funded homes to each other (Hastings 2012). With regards to 
the latter, Speaker John Bercow suffered some of the same criticism as that of his 
predecessor, Michael Martin, when he was accused of attempting to block moves to 
publish the names of MPs’ landlords under a FOI request (Unlock Democracy 2012). 
Speaker Bercow argued that releasing the names of the 27 MPs who rented to one 
another was not feasible given ‘security concerns’, but critics responded that these 
could be alleviated by simply blacking out the addresses of the properties in question.  
 
 
The legacy of the British expenses scandal, in conjunction with the global economic 
downturn, appears to have inspired similar debates in other national and supranational 
parliaments. For example, in October 2011, MEPs voted to freeze their expenditure 
allowance despite proposals by some MEPs to reduce it. This followed a decision in 
 
 
the previous June where the European Parliament ordered the publication of details of 
MEPs’ expenses. In France, National Assembly members voted in July 2012 against 
plans for external scrutiny of their £5,000 monthly expenses7 allowances,  despite 
evidence of abuse: Pascal Terrasse, Member for Ardeche, claimed expenses for his 
family holiday, and Christian Blanc, State Secretary for the Paris region, claimed 
some 12,000 for Cuban cigars.8 Canada is currently engulfed in its own expenses 
scandal, focusing predominantly on the living and travel expenses of senators. One 
senator, Pamela Wallin, has been accused of claiming parliamentary expenses while 
carrying out personal business. Although the scandal is thus far limited to a handful of 
senators, recent polling data shows that ‘86 per cent of respondents — including 
overwhelming majorities in all regions and across all age groups and party affiliations 
— feel it’s likely that MPs and senators are claiming improper expenses. Of those, 56 
per cent feel it’s very likely’.9 
 
In Italy, a rash of current scandals has raised concerns that Italian politics is still 
plagued by levels of institution corruption similar to that of the Tangentopoli scandal 
of the 1990s. Roberto Formigoni, Governor of Lombardy, himself under investigation 
for accepting paid vacations from a health care lobbyist, ‘dismissed the entire city 
government of Reggio Calabria to stave off infiltration by organized crime and 
surrendered his own government after accusations of vote-selling and more than a 
dozen regional lawmakers embroiled in scandal’.10 At the national level, Italy’s 
provision of both salary and expenses is amongst the highest in the West. Italian 
politicians can claim for ‘meals in lavish restaurants, cosmetic dentistry, private cars 
and chauffeurs, and police protection—including outriders stopping traffic to let them 
 
 
through’(Malone 2011). The degree of abuse is thought to be so extensive, that the 
scandal the engulfed British politicians would be seen as ‘amateur’ (Malone 2011).  
 
Thus, expenses related scandals are, and remain, an important and salient issue in 
many countries. The next section considers the cross-national literature on scandals 
and their impact on political life before considering in more detail, the explicitly 
mediated nature of the MPs’ expenses scandal, a feature of nearly all modern political 
scandals. The final section outlines the contributions of each of the chapters presented 
in this volume.   
  
The Political Impact of Scandal 
Knowledge of the political impact of scandals comes largely from studies of the US 
and UK, although there is a growing literature looking at scandal cross-nationally. 
This section examines the state of the literature on the impact of scandal and shows, 
despite a great deal of public knowledge/awareness of scandal and condemnation of 
politicians’ behaviour, scandals are rarely the electoral and political earthquakes they 
are initially thought to be.     
 
In the UK, scandals involving public figures have generally been labeled with the 
term ‘sleaze’, although Dunleavy and Weir (1995) delineate different types: alleged 
financial wrongdoing (including improprieties regarding lobbying, quangos, honours, 
‘jobs for the faithful’, company directorships and party fundraising); unconventional 
sexual behaviour; and salary increases for 'fat cats' in the privatized public utilities.  
Thompson (1997) also distinguishes scandal by type: those involving sex, those 
involving money (usually fraud or corruption) and those involving an abuse of power, 
 
 
although modern scandals frequently blur these boundaries. For example, in 1963 UK 
Secretary of State for War, John Profumo, who was married, had a brief sexual 
relationship with Christine Keeler. The scandal around his extra-martial affair was 
compounded by the allegation that Keeler had a relationship with a Soviet attaché, 
and her relationship with Profumo—during the peak of the Cold War—was a means 
to access top-secret British military intelligence. More recently, former US 
presidential candidate John Edwards admitted to a sexual relationship with Rielle 
Hunter, with whom he also had a child, while married to Elizabeth Edwards. This 
sexual scandal also became a financial one when Edwards was later charged with 
violating US campaign finance law for using campaign funds to cover up his 
relationship with Hunter.  
 
 
Delineating the type of scandal matters because the impact or effect of scandal varies 
depending both on its type and the cultural context. In the US, morals violations have 
been shown to result in the most severe electoral consequences and conflict of interest 
the least, ‘bringing about essentially no retribution’ (Peters and Welch 1980:703). 
However, with respect to the 1997 UK general election, Farrell et al. (1998: 88) find 
that ‘financial and sexual scandals were of about equal importance in the minds of 
voters, although neither resulted in any major shifts in votes’. They go on to point out 
however, that prior to the 1990’s, ‘almost all British scandals were concerned with 
sex, not money, while the opposite was closer to the truth in the US (King 1986). It 
may be that voters punish the types of scandals they are least familiar with in their 
particular polity’ (1998: 91). Drawing on these insights then, we would expect to find 
significant effects of the expenses scandal on electoral outcomes, however, as shown 
in chapters 4 and 5, the effects are relatively muted.   
 
 
 
 
Research into the effects of political scandal on politicians’ electoral success or 
failure reports mixed findings, but overall tends to suggest that effects are limited 
(Farrell et al. 1998 ; Alford et al. 1994; Jacobson and Dimock 1994). Several theories 
have been suggested to account for the low impact of scandal on vote share, including 
uninformed voters (Klasnja 2011), cognitive dissonance (Dimock and Jacobson 
1995), and implicit trading (Rundquist et al. 1977) Together, these suggest that while 
better informed voters may sometimes be less likely to vote for corrupt politicians, 
partisan and issue-based priorities often take precedence over scandal in determining 
vote choice. Herrick (2000) argues that the minimal effect of scandal on incumbents’ 
chances of re-election is often due to members’ degree of electoral security. While 
association with scandal tends to lead to a decline in vote share, this regularly fails to 
do away with members’ majorities altogether.  
 
 
For example, the British 1997 general election followed a torrent of sleaze allegations 
directed at the incumbent Conservative Party and saw a landslide win for New 
Labour. That year, average Tory vote loss across all seats was 11.8%, compared to 
13.5% in Conservative constituencies where the MP had been subject to an allegation 
of sleaze (Farrell et al. 1998: 789).11 However, the net electoral effect of sleaze 
allegations was much reduced when comparing predicted and actual electoral 
outcomes. While sleaze played a partial role in motivating defections by Conservative 
voters in 1997, ‘it was overshadowed by other issues, such as economic management 
and, most important of all, education’ (Farrell et al. 1998: 90). 
 
 
 
 
Similar findings have been reported relating to the 1992 U.S. House Bank scandal. 
Despite public expectations of disastrous consequences for those caught up in the 
scandal, Alford et al. (1994: 799) find ‘practically no effect of the scandal on 
reelection. While numerous challengers used the issue in their campaigns and many 
political observers braced for the impact of the Banking scandal, the issue did not 
appear to resonate with voters’. At the 1992 US congressional elections, over 80% of 
offending incumbents were re-elected (Alford et al. 1994; Dimock and Jacobson 
1995). Furthermore, the majority of those who failed to secure re-election ran in re-
drawn districts and five had to contend with fellow incumbents (Alford et al. 1994: 
789). Ahuja et al. (1994: 920) conclude that for the few who were ousted, ‘it was 
usually because there were opposed by a politically experienced, well-financed 
challenger not a novice’ (see also Abramowitz 1991). Therefore, had redistricting and 
the associated quality of challengers not been factors, the number of check-kiting 
incumbents gaining re-election may have been even higher.  
 
 
The effects of individual (rather than institution-wide) scandals are also somewhat 
limited. The average loss in vote share for US House incumbents facing allegations or 
charged with corruption has remained relatively low: between 6 and 11 per cent from 
1968 and 1978, and at 9 per cent from 1982-1990 (Welch and Hibbing 1980; 1997). 
Welch and Hibbing (1997) also show that during the period 1982-1990, the vast 
majority,75 per cent, of corruption-charged US House Representatives competing in 
general elections were successfully re-elected. However, the 25 per cent who lost 
compared to just under 3 per cent of other incumbents. So while the loss in vote share 
wasn’t substantial, it was enough to have a sizeable effect on re-election rates 
compared to ‘clean’ politicians. Welch and Hibbing suggest therefore that ‘the 
 
 
common wisdom that corrupt politicians continue to go unpunished is not altogether 
on target’ (1997: 237).  
 
Electoral security, seniority and incumbent advantage do help to protect scandal-
ridden incumbents from electoral defeat however. Peters and Welch (1980: 704) note 
that seniority provides ‘a larger cushion against retribution than that possessed by the 
more junior candidate’. Similarly, Herrick (2000: 96) finds electoral security to be the 
most significant factor affecting whether or not members accused of unethical 
behaviour can survive an election cycle. Herrick notes that while institutional power, 
media coverage, the political climate and the member’s age also impact upon their 
electoral prospects, the size of the swing necessary to oust them tends to be the most 
decisive factor. Peters and Welch (1980) and Nyblade and Reed (2008) also show that 
scandal-ridden incumbents who choose not to stand down are insulated by seniority 
and incumbent advantage. Therefore, while the negative effect of scandal on vote 
share is apparent, it often fails to be strong enough to result in a defeat of scandal-
ridden members who chose to run for re-election.  
 
 
The electoral effects of political scandal have also been found to differ along partisan 
lines. Peters and Welch (1980: 703) find that from 1968 to 1978, Democrats were 
more likely than Republicans to be charged with corruption, and lost almost twice as 
many votes as corruption-charged Republicans. Conversely however, Welch and 
Hibbing (1997: 237) find that from 1982 to 1990, all else being equal, Republicans 
were be more likely than Democrats to be charged with corruption and were also 
harder hit at the polls.12 Clarke et al. (1999) also find that Republicans were more 
affected than Democrats following the House banking scandal, a finding echoed by 
 
 
Banducci and Karp (1994). Partisan variation in the electoral effects of scandal may 
reflect many factors, including differences in the mediation of scandal and in the 
trade-offs made by voters of varying partisan affiliations. 
 
The electoral consequences of scandal can also been seen in its effect on turnover or 
members’ decisions to retire.13 Clarke et al. (1999) note that at the 1992 congressional 
elections, 66 members of the House of Representatives retired, constituting the 
highest number of retirements since the end of World War II. Of these, 53 did not 
seek another elective office (Clarke et al. 1999: 81). They find that in addition to 
scandal effects, political and economic factors also exerted significant influence on 
individual decisions to run and thus turnover (see also Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; 
Kiewiet and Zeng 1993). And again, differential partisan effects were observed. 
Although representatives for both parties were equally implicated in the scandal, 
trouble with the economy, a partisan climate hostile to Republicans, and time-limited 
claims on retirement income made Republicans more likely to retire in 1992. So while 
the scandal led to an increase in turnover, thus narrowing the pool of scandal-ridden 
incumbents seeking re-election to those with greater chances of success, the 
phenomenon was moderated by other factors which encouraged certain groups to cut 
their losses. 
 
 
While these factors help to explain why scandal often fails to result in electoral defeat, 
three additional factors relating to characteristics or behaviours of voters themselves 
—information levels, cognitive dissonance and trading—, may also serve to limit 
electoral accountability. Klasnja (2011) finds that less-informed voters are more likely 
to vote for incumbents accused of corruption, and argues therefore, that an increase in 
 
 
political awareness may serve to reduce support for malfeasant incumbents. This is 
supported by Chang et al. (2010), who argue that mediation of a political scandal may 
constitute the necessary spark to hold those implicated accountable. Their study of 
judicial investigations of malfeasance among deputies in the Italian lower house over 
the course of eleven post-war elections found that while all legislatures included 
deputies charged with malfeasance, a dramatic rise in press coverage in the 1990s 
preceeded the ousting of the previously immune corrupt legislative elite, concluding 
that ‘this change in the informational environment was crucial to the change in voter 
behavior’ (Chang et al. 2010: 213). The authors theorize that one consequence of 
mediation is that as corruption increases in salience, voters are alerted to the level of 
shared anti-corruption sentiment among them, and act to hold politicians accountable.  
 
  
Dimock and Jacobson (1995) however, observe a more perplexing pattern of 
behaviour in their study of voter reactions to the US House Bank scandal: 
‘Fortunately for members who had written bad checks, voters who knew about 
the transgression were least disposed to be outraged by it, while the voters 
most disposed to outrage were also most inclined to believe the guilty were 
innocent. The explanation for these curious patterns is that voters who faced 
the option of condemning an incumbent they otherwise appreciated or 
dismissing the offense as inconsequential often chose the latter course. The 
damage was also moderated by partisanship; voters of the incumbent's party 
showed a strong tendency to err in the incumbent's favor in assessing 
involvement in the scandal. The classical theory of cognitive dissonance 
readily explains both phenomena’ (Dimock and Jacobson 1995: 1143). 
 
 
Therefore, knowledge of a scandal may not always lead to a straightforward decrease 
in approval or likelihood of voting for malfeasant politicians. 
 
Finally, Rundquist et al. (1977: 956) propose a theory of implicit trading to describe 
why informed voters continue to vote for malfeasant candidates: ‘if candidate 
corruption is treated like any other component in the voter's choice between two 
candidates, it follows that there are conditions under which a rational voter would 
knowingly support corrupt candidates’. This is supported by Farrell et al. (1998) who 
find that British voters in 1997 prioritized education issues over sleaze allegations in 
casting ballots. Rundquist et al. (1977) suggest that a strategy for corrupt politicians 
would then be to take distinct positions on substantive issues in order to encourage 
implicit trading with specific constituencies. On balance however, the literature 
suggests that the electoral success of both incumbents and challengers associated with 
scandal may not simply be attributable to voters’ lack of knowledge, but also to their 
partisan and issue-based priorities. Therefore while knowledge may be a necessary 
condition for voters to seek electoral retribution, it does not appear to be sufficient. 
 
 
A Plague on Your Houses: Evidence of Minor Party Gains from Scandal? 
 
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider how this scandal affected minor parties’ 
fortunes post 2009 in Britain. As the evidence above suggests, mainstream parties and 
politicians do not seem suffer electorally in the medium to long term, which may not 
be surprising given that nearly all were implicated. But what, if anything, happens to 
minor party support in the short to medium term? Is there any evidence that minor 
parties’ fortunes are helped by ‘a plague on all your houses’ sentiment by the public? 
 
 
 
The minor party story in Britain post 2010 general election has been that of UKIP. 
Clearly positioned as the antithesis to the ‘Westminster-insider’, UKIP has 
experienced surge in popularity and in terms of electoral support. In the European 
Parliament elections in June 2009, one month following the break of the scandal, 
UKIP won only 7 seats—not much evidence the voters were turning to an anti-
establishment, anti-expenses party.  
 
Since then, UKIP’s popularity and electoral fortunes have blossomed. In the May 
2013 local county council elections, UKIP won over 140 seats and fielded 1,700 
candidates, three times the number that stood in 2009. They’ve also increased their 
vote share in nearly every by-election since 2010, most notably in Barnsley Central, 
taking 12% of the vote and beating the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and BNP 
into second place behind Labour. In the run up to the 2014 European Parliament 
elections, support for UKIP is at 26%, and is taking support not just from the Tories, 
but across all three major parties. But is UKIP’s increased popularity the result 
abandoning the main three parties over expenses or does it reflect UKIP’s long-
standing anti-EU, anti-immigration stance under ‘austerity’? 
 
The short answer is, not likely. One way of getting at this is to look at what UKIP was 
talking to voters about in the run up to the 2010 general election. In terms of its 
manifesto, UKIP argued for the right of the public to recall MPs, including those who 
abused expenses. But much of the language around recall was couched in references 
to bureaucracy, both Whitehall and Brussels, and giving power back to local people; 
hardly taking expenses head on.  
 
 
 
There is some evidence however, that UKIP was talking to voters about expenses 
seen in review of UK national newspapers in the month prior to the 2010 election. 
Just over one in five articles (23%) mentioned UKIP or party leader Nigel Farage and 
expenses. However, by comparison, 54% of all articles mentioned either Europe or 
immigration. The reality of austerity and the economic downturn, the re-emerging 
split within the Conservative party over Europe, and Ed Miliband’s low popularity, 
rather than expenses, are more plausible factors explaining UKIP’s rise in popularity. 
In sum, there is little evidence to support the expenses scandal had an impact on the 
party system more generally, despite the success of one anti-system party.  
 
 
 
The Negative Effects of Scandal on Trust and Confidence 
Outside the electoral arena, scandal has also been shown to negatively affect public 
trust and confidence. Unsurprisingly, scandal has been found to harm the overall 
reputation of both the individual politicians and institutions implicated in scandal 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Patterson and Magleby 1992). For example, both 
the House Banking scandal and the 1976 ‘Koreagate’ scandal—in which it had 
emerged  that members of Congress had taken bribes from South Korean 
businesspeople acting on behalf of the Korea Central Intelligence agency, with the 
intention of influencing US policy in the context of uneasy relations between the two 
countries—coincided with two of the lowest recorded approval ratings of Congress 
(Patterson and Magleby 1992, cited in Herrick 2000: 97). British public attitudes 
towards MPs following the expenses scandal were remarkably cynical: 40 per cent of 
respondents report not trusting MPs to put the national interest first and a majority 
believing MPs never tell the truth (The Telegraph 13 December 2010). The Hansard 
Society’s Democratic Audit of Political Engagement (2010: 32) however, points out 
 
 
that the expenses scandal didn't contribute to a ‘collapse in trust’ because trust was 
already so low. Instead, the scandal ‘confirmed and hardened the public’s widely held 
skepticism about politicians rather than changed their views’.  
 
In Italy, the aftermath of the Tangentopoli or ‘bribesville’ scandals was a somewhat 
more dramatic ‘citizenship revolt’, leading to a ‘massive vote against state funding of 
parties, the collapse of the traditional parties in local elections and the accompanying 
hemorrhage of membership’ (Pujas and Rhodes 1999: 49). While the severity of 
public response to scandal may vary, the negative effects of malfeasance on trust have 
also been shown to extend beyond Western Democracies. Chang and Chu’s (2006) 
study of five Asian democracies (Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand), also found a consistent ‘strongly corrosive effect of corruption on citizens’ 
trust towards political institutions’ (265). 
 
The breadth or reach of a sandal, for example whether institutional or individual in 
nature, has important implications for blame attribution and accountability. Alford et 
al. (1994: 790) distinguish between the effects of individual and institutional scandals 
on voter evaluations of candidates, noting that voters ‘discount the culpability of their 
own members for a scandal that is perceived as attached to an institution’. This 
mirrors overall gap in evaluations of individuals in institutions, seen in positive 
evaluations of local representatives despite negative evaluations of Congress as a 
whole (Fenno 1975; Parker and Davidson 1979). Alford et al. (1994: 790) contend 
that the diffuse nature of the House Bank scandal explained how it impacted on 
attitudes towards Congress without causing great harm to individual members. 
Furthermore, in individual terms, while the activation of a politician involved in a 
 
 
political scandal has been found to decrease judgements of trustworthiness of 
politicians in general (assimilation effect), it also increases judgements of other 
specific politicians not involved in the scandal (contrast effect) (Schwarz and Bless 
1992; Bless and Schwarz 1998; Bless et al. 2000). These findings, however, are 
mediated by level of expertise or information. Régner and Floch (2005: 259) show 
that when taking account of political knowledge, ‘expertise’, assimilation and contrast 
effects are present among young adults in France with a rich political knowledge, but 
tend not to be seen among those with poorer knowledge. Therefore, the impact of 
scandal on confidence and trust in individuals and institutions is not always 
straightforwardly negative, and mirrors wider patterns of conflicting attitudes towards 
politicians individually and collectively.  
 
Some cases, such as the expenses scandal constitute clear-cut examples of 
institutional scandal given the uniformity of the type of allegations made (if not the 
degree of impropriety) and the implication of all main political parties; however, 
others are less clear cut. For example, the wave of Tory ‘sleaze’ preceding the 1997 
UK general election was the result of diverse individual activities constituting several 
types of scandal, but ‘the number of cases of reported corrupt activities by 
Conservative politicians, and their prominence in the media, made the issue a 
national, collective one’ (Farrell et al. 1998: 92). Arguably, it was the way in which 
these activities were presented collectively as a ‘wave’ by the British press, which 
transformed the relatively unconnected behaviour of specific individuals into an 
institutional scandal tainting an entire political party. Had the same behaviour been 
mediated differently it may have resulted in different outcomes in perceptions of both 
individual politicians and parliament as a whole. Farrell et al. (1998:92) also argue 
 
 
that while sleaze was viewed as a national, party-wide issue in Britain in 1997, the 
1992 House Bank scandal was conceived differently in the US, ‘whose individualistic 
political culture attributes blame for corruption to the candidate, and only rarely to a 
party as a whole across the country’. Thus, the conception and mediation of a scandal 
as individual or institutional may depend both on political culture and media 
landscape. 
 
A Decline in Diffuse Party/Political Support? 
Thinking about the medium to long-term, what evidence is there that the expenses 
scandal has impacted diffuse support for the political system, if at all? Have parties, 
politicians and political institutions lost legitimacy in the eyes of the public? Data and 
research on the long-term effects of scandal are extremely limited. This is 
unsurprising given that confounding variables pose serious challenges to measuring 
the causal impact of the scandal in the short term, and even more so in the long-term. 
Even the best research designs will have difficulty teasing out a range of factors 
which may have influenced support for and engagement with the political system post 
2009: the financial crisis, BBC/Savile inquiry, press intrusion and Leveson inquiry, 
bankers’ bonuses, and the ‘Etonization’ of the front bench in government, among 
others. 
 
Castells (2007: 244) has argued that the ‘crisis of political legitimacy in most of the 
world cannot be attributed exclusively, by any means, to scandal politics and to media 
politics. Yet, scandals are most likely at the very least a precipitating factor […] in 
rooting skepticism vis-à-vis formal politics in the long term’. Perhaps the greatest 
long-term effect of the MPs’ expenses scandal, compounded by the succession of 
 
 
scandals in public institutions that followed, has been what might be termed a crisis of 
engagement.  
 
The most recent Hansard Audit (2013: 1) found that ‘just 41% of the public now say 
that in the event of an immediate general election they would be certain to vote – a 
decline of seven percentage points in a year and the lowest level in the debate of the 
Audit’. The authors contend that, ‘combined with the low turnout levels at recent 
local elections and the disastrous turnout at the polls for Police and Crime 
Commissioners in November 2012, these findings are deeply worrying for the health 
of our democracy’ (ibid: 1).  
 
Party political membership has also suffered as a result of the scandal, but it follows a 
long-term trend dating back to the 1950s. Political commentators predicted a decline 
in support for Britain’s largest political parties and the evidence suggests this has been 
the case. In 2011, the BBC noted that, ‘there are more members of the Caravan Club, 
or the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, than of all Britain's political parties 
put together’.14  
 
However, the news is not all bad with respect to party membership. The number of 
Labour party members has fluctuated more so than Conservative or Liberal Democrat 
numbers (House of Commons Library, 2012), and while the trend remains negative, 
Hansard Audit (2010:108) data following the expenses scandal showed two point rise, 
from 3 to 5%, in the number of respondents reporting having donated or paid 
membership fees to a political party. Though the rise was marginal, this was the first 
occasion in which there was a year-on-year increase since the second Audit in 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Comparative Look at Scandals and Impact 
The bulk of research into political scandal and its effects has focused on the US and 
Britain. However, available evidence from several other countries—constituting a 
variety of political contexts—reveals striking similarities in the electoral 
consequences of scandal: as in Britain and the US, they are consistently limited by 
other factors. In Europe, mayors convicted of corruption in both Spain and France 
have also enjoyed high re-election rates (Jimenez and Cainzos 2006; Lafay and 
Servais 2000). Similarly, in Japan, 60 per cent of legislators convicted of corruption 
in the post-war period were subsequently reelected (Reed 1999). Furthermore, 
legislators who were indicted on charges and ran for re-election suffered only minor 
losses in vote share, while those convicted went on to increase their vote share in 
subsequent elections (Reed 2005). 
 
Ferraz and Finan (2008) have studied the electoral effects of media coverage of 
corruption in Brazil and find that among municipalities with the same levels of 
reported corruption, those which released audits of their expenditures which were 
then reported by the local radio saw a significant effect on incumbents’ electoral 
performance. Chang et al. (2010) note similar changes in the electoral consequences 
of scandal in Italy over the postwar period, specifically following operation mani 
pulite or ‘clean hands’ of the 1990s in reponse to the Tangentiopoli scandal that 
rocked Italian politics. Tangentopoli was the name given to revelations that a number 
of political parties were being illegally financed by business and industry. Until this 
point Italy had constituted a particularly extreme case in which charges of corruption 
were not associated with loss of vote share. However, this shifted following increased 
 
 
public awareness of the extent of the issue and resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
electoral effects of scandal, rendering the country a unique example in which ‘voters 
turned on a whole class of allegedly corrupt national political leaders and ejected 
them from public office’ (Chang et al. 2010: 178). Despite these postwar shifts, a 
series of financial scandals, many associated with former Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi, in the run up to Italy’s 2012 general election has led to concerns from 
some quarters that the Tangentopoli of the 1990’s may have re-surfaced.15 
 
Cross-national similarities in the electoral consequences of scandal and the impact of 
media dissemination of information regarding corruption, stand in contrast to 
differences in the types of scandal which capture media and public attention across 
different countries. These differences have been discussed previously in relation to 
the contrast between UK and the US, but Thompson (2000: 10) notes similar 
differences elsewhere: ‘sex scandals typically play  a much less significant role in 
French or Italian political life than they do in Britain, for example, while political 
scandals in France and Italy have been concerned primarily with corruption and abuse 
of power’. While the focus on financial matters in Italian political scandals is 
explained by high levels of corruption in the country, the British and American focus 
on sex suggests the degree to which national media and public in both countries 
continue to be scandalized by the infidelities of their political leaders.  
 
 
While Italy and Sweden represent two extremes in terms of financial corruption in 
politics, mediated political scandal in both countries has focused on financial 
dealings. This is explained by the features of Nordic political culture, ‘in which 
legislation and official regulation play a central role, [therefore] political scandals 
 
 
often involve violations of decisions, rules or statutes concerning economic affairs’ 
(Allern and Pollack 2012: 15). So in Italy, the prevalence of financial scandal results 
from high levels of corruption, while in Sweden corruption levels are low and the 
focus on financial scandal is instead motivated by the severity with which even minor 
financial wrongdoing is judged. However, while economic affairs continue to 
dominate Nordic political scandal, those involving politicians’ private lives have risen 
in prominence over the past few decades (Allern et al. 2012). This may perhaps point 
to a degree of convergence as global media trends continue to shape the way in which 
political scandal is mediated. 
 
 
A Modern, Mediated Scandal 
The British MPs expenses scandal cannot be understood in isolation from the modern, 
mass media which played an integral part in its revelation, dominance and persistence 
in May 2009. It was, a mediated scandal. In other words, it was a scandal played out 
first and foremost in the media: public knowledge and experience of MPs’ 
malfeasance was made possible via the mass media, which gave life to and sustained 
the scandal in the weeks following the initial revelations. Lull and Hinerman (1997: 
11-13) provide a list of criteria that serve to systematically identify characteristics of 
mediated scandal: 
 1) social norms reflecting the dominant morality must be transgressed […] 
The transgressions must be performed by 2) specific persons who carry out 3) 
actions that reflect an exercise of their desires or interests […] Further, 
individual persons must be 4) identified as perpetrators of the act(s). The must 
be shown to have acted 5) intentionally or recklessly and must be 6) held 
responsible for their actions. The actions and events must have (7) differential 
 
 
consequences for those involved. […] revelations must be 8) widely circulated 
via communications media where they are 9) effectively narrativized into a 
story which 10) inspires widespread interest and discussion. 
 
Lull and Hinerman’s definition sets out the necessary components of a mediated 
scandal, but it retains a degree of separation between the acts which constitute a 
scandal and their mediation. Conversely, Thompson (2010) conceives of mediated 
political scandal as a unified process in which the scandal is itself constituted by its 
mediation and more accurately captures the expenses scandal under investigation 
here. Thompson (2000: 61) notes that ‘disclosure through the media, and commentary 
in the media, are not secondary or incidental features of these forms of scandal: they 
are partly constitutive of them’. Therefore, he argues, ‘a mediated scandal does not 
begin with the transgression itself, but rather with the act of disclosure and/or 
allegation which turns the original transgression into an object of public knowledge’ 
(2000: 73).  
 
 
Allern and Pollack (2012: 22) build on Thompson’s conception, employing the 
metaphor of a drive hunt to describe the process:  
‘There must be a pack of hunters and numerous editors evaluating the 
situation’s nature and news value in the same way. The media’s dramatic 
focus requires the hunt to be undertaken over a certain period of time and-in 
order to increase the level of suspense and public attention, uncertainty 
regarding the consequences and outcome’ (Nord 2001).  
Thus, in the case of the British MPs’expenses scandal, The Telegraph maximized 
suspense by drip-feeding details of misdoing over several days, and meanwhile the 
 
 
news value the story was consistent across other news publications and platforms, 
remaining at the top of the headlines wherever the reader turned. 
 
 
Both Thompson and Allern and Pollack conceive of mediated political scandal as a 
collective event which includes several stages comprising a sequence of moves by all 
of the relevant actors. This conception of mediated scandal is useful in considering 
the distinctions between institutional and individual scandal discussed previously, 
given that to some degree this distinction rests not simply on the behaviour of those 
accused, but the way in which that behaviour is framed, and responses and counter-
responses by the subjects, press and public are subsequently collectivized. 
Additionally, the similarities in Thompson’s and Allern and Pollack’s conceptions of 
mediated scandal, who consider US and Scandinavian contexts respectively, suggests 
an interesting degree of cross-cultural similarity in the way in which mediated 
scandals are manifested in each region, despite significant differences in their media 
and political landscapes.  
 
 
Lull and Hinerman (1997:1) suggest that the rising prevalence of mediated scandal in 
general may be viewed both as ‘a distinctive sign of the “Murdochization” of modern 
media’ and, in the U.S. as, ‘part of the ultra-conservative overall trend in popular 
culture’ (1997: 5). In addition to sweeping changes to the make-up of the media 
industries and the role of journalists, Thompson (2000: 8-9) also argues that the 
weakening of ideological, class-based politics and belief systems in favour of more 
candidate-centred politics has contributed to the positioning of mediated political 
scandal in a ‘a newly potent and self-reinforcing role as a “credibility test”’.  
 
 
 
This aspect of mediated political scandal is perhaps most significant in the context of 
high-profile, closely fought and candidate-centred electoral contests. For example, 
Gronbeck (1997: 125) argues that during presidential campaigns, ‘the line between 
political and entertainment reporting all but disappears [and] issues like character 
(political morality) and celebrity (popularity, likability) are melded’. In this context, 
Gronbeck argues, voters turn to character over issues as a guide to voting, and 
therefore scandal can make or break a campaign. ‘Such an amalgamation of character 
and celebrity by the press has made meta-politics and meta-ethics, rather than actual 
political action and concrete morally relevant activity, the pivots upon which electoral 
decisions turn’ (Gronbeck 1997: 125). Furthermore, Welch and Hibbing (1997: 228) 
note that ‘the continued lack of policy awareness of many voters and the continued 
decline of political parties as voting cues mean that image-based variables have 
become more central’. Scandal can also be perceived as easier to judge than policy 
success or failure. For example, Jacobson and Dimock (1994: 622) point out that 
scandal can sometimes be measured in a way that responsibility for economic crises 
may not be. Thus in the context of elections following the U.S. House Bank scandal 
‘voters had no way to measure their representative's personal contribution to the 
savings and loan fiasco or the budget deficits, but they did know who wrote 
overdrafts-particularly where challengers mounted vigorous campaigns to remind 
them’.  
 
The suggested melding of political actors with celebrity, combined with a lack of 
policy awareness among voters as factors contributing to the central position of 
mediated political scandal in high profile campaigns, points to the possibility of a 
self-reinforcing cycle in which issues slide down the agenda, while the hunt for 
 
 
scandalizing personal details increases in force. However, the issue agendas of 
particular campaigns may not always lose in the tug of war over column inches, and 
even if they do, voters may continue to prioritize other concerns. For example, 
Jacobson and Dimock (1994: 621) note during in the 1992 US presidential campaign, 
‘the economy, taxes, and the future direction of the country [..] may have reduced the 
importance of overdrafts compared to the candidates' basic partisan differences on 
these national issues’. Furthermore, despite ‘a series of colourful stories about the 
sexual proclivities of certain Conservative candidates’ (Farrell et al. 1998: 82), sleaze 
only accounted for 12 per cent of all policy coverage during the UK 1997 general 
election campaign (Norris 1997, cited in Farrell et al. 1998: 83).  
 
Examples from the US House Bank scandal and UK 1997 general election, discussed 
previously, suggest that scandalous behaviour itself (as distinct from mediated 
political scandal) has limited electoral consequences and voters themselves report 
(though with debatable reliability) that other issues take precedence when weighing 
up their choices. However, Herrick (2000) finds that durring the period 1977 to 1995, 
the more media coverage a member of the U.S. Congress received realating to an 
allegation, the more likely their departure. This confirms the power of mediated 
political scandal to excerbate the electoral effects of scandalous behaviour by 
individual members.  
 
 
This may have particularly troubling consequences for candidates and legislators from 
underrepresented groups. Niven (2004) investigates racial, gendered and partisan bias 
in newspaper coverage of the U.S. House Bank scandal, comparing the degree of 
criticism received by check-bouncing House members of different groups. He notes: 
 
 
‘by utilizing a baseline of known political behavior, (the number of overdrawn 
checks) as a basis for studying media coverage, we can eliminate the vast number of 
complicating realities that otherwise preclude us from reasonably concluding that a 
difference in coverage is the result of bias, and the lack of difference in coverage is 
evidence of fairness’ (Niven 2004: 649-50). While no partisan differences were 
found, women and ethnic minority members were penalized more severely than white 
males by longer, more prominent and more negative coverage. If an increase in the 
frequency of coverage of a political scandal increases the likelihood of departure of 
the individual concerned, and women and minorities receive disproportionately high 
levels of news coverage when embroiled in a political scandal, they are therefore 
likely to face consequences unequal to those of their white, male counterparts.  
 
Furthermore, Hammarlin and Jarlbro (2012) argue that gendered comments and 
criticisms were rife in coverage of the then Swedish Deputy Prime Minister Mona 
Sahlin during the so-called ‘Toblerone Affair’, a high-profile financial scandal 
surrounding the Sahlin’s use of an official credit card for personal purchases which 
included, to the delight of the Swedish press, several Toblerone bars. Therefore, 
mediated political scandal may at times constitute a platform for the manifestation of 
gendered or other biases cloaked beneath scandalized indignation.  
 
Mediated political scandals also remain in collective memory with possible effects 
long after the period in which they occur. For example, Lull and Hinerman (1997: 18) 
argue that ‘Watergate and Richard Nixon have become synonymous with scandal. 
Any scandalous misdeeds attributed to a politician today will necessarily be read 
against this generalized reputation of party politics’. Thompson (2000: 265) also 
 
 
identifies the tendency of scandals to appear in cycles or waves in which  ‘each 
scandal raises the political stakes still further and increases the symbolic and political 
value that might be derived—both for political opponents and for media organizations 
and personnel—from further revelations’. However, while mediated scandals may 
damage the collective reputation of political actors over time, they do not necessarily 
have negative consequences for specific individuals in the longer term. 
 
 
The Expenses Scandal: Evidence of a Revolution? 
The primary aim of the book is to understand the expenses scandal: its origins, 
evolution and consequences for political life; and where appropriate, we consider the 
generalizability of the MPs’ expenses scandal to scandals elsewhere. In the chapters 
that follow, we take an in-depth look at the scandal, from its origins in the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOI), to the political response to the scandal, the creation of the 
IPSA, and everything in between. Five years on, and drawing on the best data 
available, the authors here consider the impact of the 2009 MPs’ expenses scandal on 
British political life.  
 
 
In chapter 2, Ben Worthy examines the origins of the expenses scandal in the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOI) and the efforts by campaigners, led by Heather 
Brooke, over a period of years to gain access to the expense claims made by MPs. 
Worthy provides an in-depth analysis of the workings of FOI showing how it both 
constrained and facilitated the release of the data. The chapter draws on interview 
data with key actors, considering the role of FOI legislation in making government 
more transparent and accountable to the public. Worthy then provides a comparative 
look at how other countries with similar FOI legislation, including Ireland, New 
 
 
Zealand, Australia and Canada, and devolved institutions within the UK have 
navigated expenses scandals/enquiries.  
 
 
Chapter 3 looks at the expenses scandal from the inside. Tony Wright, who sat in the 
Commons from 1992 until 2010 (Labour, Cannock Chase), explores the expenses 
system that MPs designed and administered in a culture of self-regulation. Wright 
explores the context of the scandal, showing how the pay and expenses system for 
Members of Parliament developed over time and the confusions and behaviours that 
this gave rise to. He gives considerable attention to the Additional Costs Allowance 
(ACA) scheme, the core of the expenses regime that allowed MPs to claim for 
expenses incurred from staying away from their primary residence and the focal point 
of much of the abuse. In conclusion, Wright explores the consequences of the scandal 
including reforms that have enabled the House of Commons to seek to restore its 
reputation by demonstrating its relevance. 
 
 
The next three chapters consider the electoral impact of the scandal. In chapter 4, 
Jennifer vanHeerde-Hudson asks to what extent was the expenses scandal a factor in 
MPs’ decision to stand down or voluntarily exit the House of Commons? The 
evidence here suggests that it was: it did not however, have the impact many 
suspected given the intense media scrutiny and public outrage following the 
Telegraph’s initial revelations. In fact, it was the more mundane and less 
controversial factors such as age and seniority, which played a bigger role in MPs’ 
decision to stand down before the 2010 general election.  
 
 
 
In chapter 5, Charles Pattie and Ron Johnston ask to what extent public anger over the 
expenses scandal had any measureable impact on the 2010 election outcome with 
respect to turnout and vote choice? Their analysis shows that despite worrisome 
predictions, voters didn’t take the scandal as a reason to abandon electoral politics. At 
the constituency level, indignation over MPs’ expenses was a mild discouragement to 
participation, no more. Moreover, the decision to vote or not was influenced by the 
same factors as in previous elections: what people thought of the scandal had no 
independent influence once these well-established factors were taken into account. 
Pattie and Johnston show that voters were undoubtedly disturbed by the expenses 
scandal, but few MPs who stood for re-election had their prospects damaged by their 
involvement in the scandal. Valence issues, such as concern over the state of the 
national and international economies, trumped concerns over the scandal.  
 
 
In chapter 6 Nick Vivyan, Markus Wagner and Jessica Tarlov examine voter 
knowledge of MPs’ misconduct in the expenses scandal. Given the institutional make-
up of the UK, which encourages voters to see their electoral choice as one between 
parties and not between candidates, we would not expect many voters to know whether 
their MP was involved in the scandal or not. They show that in general, voters’ 
perceptions of their MP’s behaviour do correspond, at least somewhat, to their actual 
involvement in the scandal, and that voters’ perceptions were biased by their political 
predispositions. However, voters did not punish their MPs for their perceived 
misconduct: the link between perceptions and vote choice was weak compared to that 
between publicly available information and perceptions. 
 
 
 
In chapter 7, Nicholas Allen and Sarah Birch shift focus and consider the impact of 
the scandal on public attitudes toward politicians and politics. They argue there is a 
structural gap between citizens' expectations of politicians, on the one hand, and their 
perceptions of politicians' conduct, on the other, that stems from differing 
understandings of the ethical norms governing politics. Their findings show that 
contrary to expectations, the scandal’s impact was surprisingly limited. If anything, 
respondents were less critical of politicians six months after the scandal than 
immediately before the media frenzy first broke. Allen and Birch discuss various 
psychological and structural factors that account for this finding and locate the public 
response to the scandal within the broader mood of disenchantment that currently 
pervades British politics. 
 
In chapter 8, Valentino Larcinese and Indraneel Sircar examine whether there is 
evidence of partisan media bias in coverage of the UK expenses scandal, since certain 
newspapers have traditional and fairly well known right- or left-leaning preferences. 
Drawing on data from widely read UK papers, as well as biographical and electoral 
data, their results do not show evidence of partisan media bias. However, they show 
that MPs received higher levels of coverage across all newspapers if they were on the 
front bench, misappropriated higher sums of money or received more media coverage 
before the scandal. Their evidence also points to gender differences in media coverage 
of the scandal.  
 
The regulatory consequences of the scandal are considered in the final two chapters. 
In chapter 9, Oonagh Gay traces parliamentary reaction to the Members’ expenses 
crisis, which led to the creation of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority 
 
 
(IPSA). The chapter considers the evolution of IPSA, its role, remit and importantly, 
the perceptions of both the public and MPs in regulating the new expenses regime. 
Gay argues that in its dual role as both regulator and administrator, IPSA has caused 
tension with its customers, and there are continuing questions about its long-term 
viability, given the administrative overheads. 
 
In the concluding chapter, Justin Fisher and Jennifer vanHeerde-Hudson consider the 
impact of the MPs’ expenses scandal on British politics and in light of scandals 
elsewhere. The chapter highlights some of the dangers of political reform in direct 
response to institutional scandals, in particular how reform efforts can often produce 
unintended consequences or encourage loophole seeking behaviour elsewhere. Final 
consideration is given to the role of IPSA and its role in servicing its clients, restoring 
confidence in the Parliamentary expenses regime and in parties and politicians 
themselves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Endnotes 
1 London-based MPs were not eligible for additional costs allowances, but instead 
received a London Supplement (less than £3,000 in 2007-08).  
2 See http://www.public- standards.gov.uk/Library/Background_Paper_No_2.__ 
Timeline _of_ Events.pdf for a complete timeline to the expenses scandal. 
3 The Telegraph’s revelations were not the first to be brought to the public’s attention. 
Leaks from the disk had emerged in February of 2009 including Jacqui Smith’s claim 
for pornographic films published by the Sunday Express and Tony McNulty’s parent’s 
home as his second home, thereby qualifying for allowances under the ACA.  
4 Viner, Katherine, Interview with Gordon Brown, 20 June 2009, The Guardian 
Online.  
5 Four MPs have been jailed for illegal expenses claims, Elliot Morley, Jim Devine, 
Eric Illsley and David Chaytor.  
6 See for example, Robin Oakley, ‘Anger at UK MPs' Expenses Could Change 
Politics, 11 May 2009.  
7 The Times, ‘Look at our expenses? No you don’t say French MPs’, 25 July 2012. 
8 See BBC News Europe, ‘French MPs Throw Out Proposal to Audit the Expenses’, 
26 July 2012.   
9 The Star, ‘Senators and MPs Likely Cheating on Expenses, Canadians tell Pollsters’, 
14 June 2013.  
10 New York Times, ‘Corruption Rattles Already Shaky Italians’ Trust in Politicians’, 
17 October 2012.   
11 These figures exclude Scotland, where no Tory MPs had been subject to an 
allegation of sleaze. 
                                                        
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
12 Welch and Hibbing note: ‘This is not consistent with the findings of Peters and 
Welch. It is consistent with the general pattern of results indicating that previous vote 
is less predictive for Republican candidates, leaving more clout to be exercised by 
national partisan swing, scandal, and presumably other, more idiosyncratic variables’ 
(1997: 236). 
13 See chapter 4 for detailed analysis of the impact of the expenses scandal on MPs’ 
decision to stand down.  
14 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12934148, 19 August 2011. 
 
15 Financial Times, ‘Italy’s Scandals Echo the “Tangentopoli’”, 21 February 2013.  
